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In this case study, we analyze in a French public company the adoption mode of a new 
management control system pertaining to New Public Management principles. We 
compare the formal system designed and deployed in the organization, the discourses of 
its promoters and users and the observed practices of the latter. We identify clear 
decoupling patterns occurring there at the utilization level of the new system. We 
elaborate on the notion of decoupling and discuss the reasons conducing to the observed 
decoupling patterns in this organization. 
 





Nous analysons le mode d'adoption dans une grande entreprise publique française d'un 
nouveau système de contrôle de gestion inspiré des principes du Nouveau Management 
Public. Nous comparons le système formel, tel qu'il a été conçu et déployé dans 
l'organisation, les discours de ses promoteurs et de ses utilisateurs et les pratiques de ces 
derniers. Nos analyses font apparaître l'existence d'un découplage au niveau de 
l'utilisation du nouveau système. Nous discutons la notion de découplage et les raisons 
ayant conduit à l'existence d'un découplage dans l'organisation étudiée. 
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  1Management Accounting Change in the Public Sector: 
A French case study and a New Institutionalist Perspective 
 
 
Abstract: In the public sector management accounting change is often associated with 
implementation of New Public Management (NPM) principles. This article uses the 
new institutionalist perspective to analyse the implementation of a new performance 
measurement and management system in a large French public firm, thus contributing 
to documenting implementation of NPM in France (which has rarely been addressed 
hitherto). We observed various forms of decoupling at the utilisation stage of the 
system. Findings contribute to suggesting three steps in the adoption of managerial 
innovations (design, implementation, and utilisation) and validate prior research 
regarding the impact of power, actors’ resistance and internal legitimacy concerns on 
decoupling. 
 
Key words: new institutionalism, new public management, France, accounting change, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Relevance and objective 
 
Management accounting change in the public sector is generally associated with 
the diffusion of New Public Management (NPM). Indeed NPM encompasses “explicit 
formal measurable standards and measures of performance and success” and a “greater 
emphasis on output controls”, which are implemented through “performance indicators 
and audit” and a “move away from detailed accounting for particular activity to broader 
cost centre accounting” (Hood, 1995: 96). Following, management accounting change 
in the public sector often consists of new accounting systems, especially cost systems, 
new budgetary procedures and/or new performance measurement (and management) 
systems. Such innovations have been extensively studied under the new institutionalist 
sociological perspective - which is consistent with the focus of the associated theory on 
the diffusion and adoption of management innovations in organisations embedded in a 
socio-economic and socio-political institutional context. As of today the available body 
of new institutionalism-informed research on NPM comprises studies of different types 
of public settings (mainly universities, hospitals and local governments, occasionally 
police force or public companies) in various countries, for instance Norway (Pettersen, 
1995; Johnsen, 1999; Modell, 2001), Sweden (Modell, 2003), the United Kingdom 
(Berry et al., 1985; Collier, 2001; McGivern, 2003; Chang, 2005), the United States 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Covaleski et al., 1993; Westphal et al., 1997), Portugal 
(Major and Hopper, 2004), Austria (Piber and Pietsch, 2005) and Italy (Caccia et al., 
2005). However, as far as we know, no research has been conducted in France.  
 
This would however be of interest since there are some divergent forces towards 
the adoption of NPM in France. On the one hand, from the beginning of the 80s various 
governments have been engaged in public service renewal. First, decentralisation and 
deconcentration (from 1982 on) created spaces of managerial autonomy in public sector. 
Then from 1989 on, “modernization” introduced the notion of responsibility centres, 
greater emphasis on management and responsiveness to users and institutionalised 
policy evaluation. And third, although both nationalisations and privatisations were 
carried out during the period, “overall the period since 1980 has seen a significant fall in 
the public sector’s share of the French labor force” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 249). 
All these moves can explain why, drawing on figures from the 70s and 80s, France was 
placed in the “medium” category for the adoption of NPM in a comparative study of 
OECD countries’ engagement towards NPM (Hood, 1995). On the other hand however, 
French public sector renewal sometimes brutally collides with powerful public sector 
unions, as shown by recurring major strikes (1992, 1995…) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004: 248). Beyond corporatism internal resistance to modernisation has been attributed 
to the French public sector’s “cultural scheme” which has been described as “anti-
managerial” (Blondel, 1991: 104). This brief inventory of competing forces makes 
research on the adoption of NPM in France especially relevant: beyond political 
willingness and unions’ and actors’ resistance, where is NPM adoption up to? Hence the 
piece of research reported in this article is intended to shed light on the adoption of 
NPM in France. This will complement the available body of research regarding the 
diffusion of innovative accounting systems in the European public sector.  
  2Our aim is also to contribute to understanding adoption processes. Hence we will 
focus on the analysis of possible decoupling. Indeed, as we shall explain below, 
decoupling (i.e. a difference between the formal adoption of innovations in 
organisations’ formal structures and the actual impact of adopted innovations on 
organizations’ operational activities), a central notion in new institutionalist reading, 
tells us how innovations are adopted, thus contributing to an understanding of the 
adoption processes. Prior new institutionalist-inspired research (Covaleski et al., 1993; 
Oliver, 1991) has suggested that resistance generates decoupling and so, we would 
expect to observe a certain level of decoupling in France, consistently with the existence 
of forces resisting NPM in France. Beyond the general definition of decoupling, we also 
hope to evidence its precise forms, as well as how these forms articulate with social and 
technical organizational contexts. 
 
Methodology and structure 
 
As is relevant with this type of investigation we conducted a case study. We 
observed the adoption and implementation of a new performance measurement and 
management system aiming at introducing NPM principles in the maintenance and 
engineering works Division (thereafter Inf-Rail) of a large French public sector 
transport company (thereafter, F-Rail). The new system consisted of: (1) the 
implementation of periodic performance management meetings (thereafter performance 
meetings), during which exchange is based on (2) a new tableau de bord (thereafter 
performance scorecard) which includes traditional, operations-oriented non-financial 
performance measures and new financial measures (e.g. unit costs). 
 
Research was designed so as to overcome some methodological limitations 
evidenced by prior research. Thus Staw and Epstein (2000) pointed out that, to assess 
the implementation of TQM, interviewing top managers was not enough and “to create 
a fully accurate indicator of TQM implementation, one might also want to interview 
lower-level employees and observe the actual workings of various quality programs” 
(2000: 534, footnote1). Our observations rely on the triangulation of (i) archival internal 
documents (mainly the closing address of the Division CEO at an Inf-Rail Convention, 
a project document from Inf-Rail Finance Department, and the hands-out given to 
participants in training seminars about the new system); (ii) open interviews of a whole 
variety of managers directly concerned with the use and implementation of the new 
system in different geographical areas, at various hierarchical levels, and both in the 
operational line and in the financial function; (iii) passive observation of performance 
meetings in different geographical areas and at various hierarchical levels. We believe 
that such diversity of respondents and observations will strengthen our conclusions 
about the scope and impact of decoupling. 
 
Inf-Rail’s geographical organisation has four levels: national, regional and 
locally, the levels of “establishments” and “operating units” (or OU) (see next section 
for the detailed presentation of each level’s responsibilities). We focused our 
observations on two regions and four local establishments (two in each region). We 
observed eleven performance meetings and before these meetings, we interviewed 29 
key-participants in these meetings (average interview time: one and a half hour-two 
hours). Indeed the observed meetings being spaces of appraisal, thus source of 
  3discomfort for both evaluatees and evaluators, the presence of observers could be 
perceived as particularly intrusive, and beyond bias interactions during the meeting. 
Interviewing individually participants before the meeting made it possible to create trust 
between participants and the research team, then to limit biases related to observation. 
We thus interviewed:  
•  the two directors of the sectors supervising the two regions under study, 
at the national divisional headquarters (thereafter SECDIR). Indeed we chose our two 
regions in two different sectors so as to enhance further variety of observation;  
•  in each region, the regional delegate for the division (REGDIR) and two 
of his assistants: the regional production manager (REGPROD) and the regional 
management accountant (REGMAC),  
•  in each establishment, the establishment manager (ESTDIR), his two 
assistants respectively in charge of production (ESTPROD) and management 
accountant (ESTMAC), and depending on establishments and their managers’ 
willingness, from zero to two operating unit managers (OUMAN). 
•   
Accordingly, the eleven performance meetings were observed at the three 
hierarchical interfacing levels. In each meeting (one hour to two hours and a half, 
depending on the hierarchical level) there were participants of the evaluated entity and 
of the supervising entity – those whom we had met previously and occasionally other 
colleagues of theirs. We thus observed meetings at the region-sector level (2 meetings), 
at the establishment-region level (4 meetings) and at the OU-establishment level (5 
meetings).  
 
Our pre-survey (collection of archival documents and interviews of the design 
team at headquarters) took place between June 2003 and February 2004, and the 
interviews and observations were carried out between April 2004 and September 2004. 
At that time performance meetings have been held for more than one year (they started 
in April 2003). 
 
Observing meetings made it possible to control self-declaration biases and also 
to confront individual discourses about organisational and system change with the 
system’s collective implementation, hence to “cross” representations and behaviours, 
discourse and practice, individual and collective levels, intended and actual changes. 
 
From the first interviews on, it appeared clearly that recording was detrimental 
to the spontaneity and authenticity of response. Hence we gave up recording and 
interviews were systematically conducted by two (sometimes three) researchers so that 
to dispose of the most exhaustive notes. Depending on the number of participants, two 
or three researchers observed performance management meetings. Hence we do not 
dispose of the verbatim of interviews and meetings but the comparison of our individual 




                                                           
1 Final transcription results from transcription by the first researcher, incrementally complemented by the 
second one (and third one, when applicable). All involved researchers met for validation of the final 
transcription. All discrepancies in individual transcriptions were discussed and referred to context for 
final decision.      
  4The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Part Two recalls the main 
elements of the new institutionalist theory, the concept of decoupling and principles of 
NPM. In the Third Part, we present the case setting (Inf-Rail) and the formal features of 
the new performance system. We use archival documents to show how the new system 
is intended to operationalize NPM principles as defined in Part Two, namely (i) 
competition, (ii) transparency and accountability and (iii) efficiency and cost reduction. 
Part Four analyses the implementation of the new performance system by comparing 
the formal features and intended uses (as described in Part Three) with actual 
implementation and usage as of our various observations (interviews and meetings). 
Findings are discussed in Part Five, especially with regard to prior research about NPM 
and related decoupling. The concluding Part synthesises the contribution of this 
research to the new institutionalist framework and suggests further academic 
perspectives. 
 
2. New Institutionalism, decoupling and NPM 
 
Decoupling in new institutionalist theory 
 
Since the seminal works of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), generally regarded as having been the founding contributions of the sociological 
new institutionalist stream of research, the adoption and diffusion of management 
innovations in organizations have been studied extensively through the lenses of this 
theory which considers that legitimacy seeking organizations would adopt socially 
valued innovations irrespective of the prospective technical contribution of these 
innovations in terms of enhanced efficiency and effectiveness. New institutionalist 
readings of the adoption and diffusion of innovations addressed two different questions 
regarding these processes: why innovations diffuse and why organizations adopt them, 
on the one hand, how innovations diffuse and how organizations adopt them, on the 
other. Whereas both types of questions were underlying the founding contributions of 
this theoretical stream, interest and research in organization studies have mainly focused 
on the determinants for diffusion and adoption. Thus Mizruchi and Fein (1999) 
inventoried numerous works, in North-American management research, which have 
built around DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of mimetic isomorphism in 
explaining adoption and diffusion patterns, thus focusing on a sub-set of the DiMaggio 
and Powell’s theoretical framework regarding the “why” question. 
Central to the question regarding how innovations diffuse and are adopted by 
organizations is Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) decoupling thesis that organizations would 
formally adopt innovations without actually implementing them. In so doing, 
organizations would conform to their environment while buffering the technical core of 
their operations from these environmental pressures and uncertainties: “From an 
institutionalist perspective […] the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often 
presumed to be sufficient to attain legitimacy” (Oliver, 1991: 155). Rational rules and 
procedures such as those mobilized in management accounting systems make it possible 
to maintain and develop an appearance of rationality vis-à-vis stakeholders in the 
organization, a “rational myth” or shared belief about the rational functioning of 
organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As noted by Westphal and Zajac (2001), 
though, few studies have explored Meyer and Rowan’s decoupling thesis. The European 
or Scandinavian approach of new-institutionalism has paid more attention to the 
  5practical context of the diffusion of management innovation, underlining the translation 
processes that imported innovations undergo when they diffuse in a national or regional 
business context or are adopted by and implemented in a given organization 
(Czarniawska and Sevòn, 1996; Gooderham et al., 1999; Guler et al., 2002). While the 
processes through which innovations and management ideas “travel over time and 
space” have been documented and conceptualized, the impact that these “knowledge 
flows” (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 2002) actually exerts on organizational 
practices remains difficult to ascertain: “(…) even though we find that individual 
management models or techniques are often loosely coupled to organizational 
operations, these models carry the potential to redirect the allocation of organizational 
resources, attention, and operations” (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 2002: 292, italics 
added). Yet decoupling patterns would be more likely to be met with certain 
management systems: “(…) accounting and evaluation systems leave more possibilities 
for organizations to decouple practice from models” (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, 
2002: 291). In the same token, Carruthers (1995: 326) noted that “accounts are the 
quintessential rationalized myth, and it is surprising that new institutionalists have not 
devoted more time to studying them”. Until recently indeed, few studies in management 
accounting research have adopted a new institutionalist perspective in accounting for 
the diffusion and adoption of innovations related to performance management systems 
and most studies have focused on questions dealing with the reasons for diffusion and 
adoption rather than on the adoption modes of these innovations, that is, whether 
adopting new performance management systems leads to their decoupling from the 
management of operations (Lapsey and Wright, 2004; Major and Hopper, 2004; 
Brignall and Modell, 2000; Modell, 2004). Modell’s (2003) research on the 
development of performance measurement in the Swedish university sector focuses on 
the diffusion process of this innovation- the how question- yet at the macro level of 
institutional fields. Modell’s (2001) study of the diffusion and adoption of new 
budgetary principles in a Norwegian public hospital, building on Oliver’s (1991) 
framework, investigated the rationales underlying respondents’ discourses for the 
adoption of the innovation. While conclusions are drawn regarding when decoupling 
would be more likely to occur, the focus is nonetheless placed on the reasons and 
contextual conditions conducing to the adoption of the innovation. Collier’s (2001) 
study of the introduction of financial management in a police force constitutes one of 
the few studies which have concentrated on explaining how an innovation had been 
adopted. Coherent with Modell’s (2001) analysis balancing legitimacy and efficiency 
considerations, Collier argues that loose coupling could be a helpful concept in 
explaining how the management of an organization could reconcile conflicting 
institutional (i.e. pertaining to legitimacy) and technical (efficiency-oriented) demands. 
In particular, accounting, in the studied organisational setting, acted as a “discourse 
between the demands of external accountability an operational policing” (2001: 483). 
The author concludes that “[the] paper should (…) encourage other organizational level 
studies in management accounting change using institutional theory, which might take a 
closer look at relations of power and how loose coupling is effected” (ibid.). 
 
Modell (2001) and Collier (2001) frameworks introduce the consideration of 
adopters’ interests and power relationships within the adopting organisation to account 
for decoupling or loosely coupling in the adoption of innovations. Decoupling may be 
reinterpreted in terms of resistance from actors towards the ongoing change. According 
  6to Oliver (1991: 155), decoupling is a means of avoidance of institutional pressure 
towards isomorphism. She argues that actors are not passive to pressure: a whole range 
of responses (from acquiescence to manipulation) is available, with avoidance standing 
in the middle range. Such general proposal has been reformulated by Brignall and 
Modell (2000: 295) who have hypothesised that pro-active decoupling could be useful 
to limit the level of conflict of interests between funding bodies and professionals 
within the organisation. Drawing on health care sector observations, Covaleski et al. 
have added that “the relative power, or resources deployed by, those being controlled 
determines the effectiveness of the resistance” and “effective resistance contributes to 
the decoupling between institutionalised practices and internal operations” (1993: 73). 
To sum up, when professionals have interests conflicting with those of funding bodies, 
they are likely to resist institutional pressure towards isomorphism. This resistance 
generates decoupling, and the higher the power of professionals within the organisation, 
the higher their resistance and the greater the decoupling. According to Collier, though, 
power can also be analyzed as “enabling”, in as much as “shifts in power” can allow 
“conflicting interests to coincide” (2001: 483). 
 
NPM and decoupling 
 
NPM can be defined as encompassing a set of principles and techniques related 
to enhanced transparency and accountability in the management and use of public 
funding, higher efficiency or enhanced economic performance (namely, cost reduction) 
and the introduction, through competition, of the disciplinary mechanisms of external or 
internal markets (Power, 1997, 2003; Modell, 2004). For the purpose of this analysis, in 
the next parts of our demonstration, we will consider three aspects in NPM: (i) existence 
of competition, (ii) transparency and accountability to funding bodies and (iii) search 
for and realisation of efficiency and cost reduction. 
 
NPM is generally regarded as having diffused across national boundaries 
(Power, 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). In France, the reform of the public sector, 
engaged since the 1980s in several public companies (e.g. the telecom and electricity 
public companies) as well as in public hospitals illustrates this diffusion process. The 
adoption in 2001 of a new law
2 regarding public spending has been a further step 
towards the institutionalization of NPM principles in the French context. This law, 
voted unanimously in 2001 by the French Parliament, would foster the transition from a 
“budget of means (…) to logic of results and objectives” (National Assembly, 2005). 
Starting with the budget prepared and voted in 2005 for the fiscal year 2006, the French 
State budget shall no longer be divided into titles and chapters (850 in the 2005 budget) 
yet in 34 missions subdivided into 132 programs. Each program shall be accompanied 
with an annual project of performance that includes a strategy, objectives and 
performance indicators, four out of five of these performance indicators being expressed 
in quantitative terms. 
 
At the level of public sector organizations, NPM, like other management 
systems such as Activity-Based Management or Total Quality Management (TQM) that 
would embrace the whole organizational structure, is conceptually intended to change 
                                                           
2 Law LOLF (Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finances, or organic law relative to finance laws, n° 
2001-692 of the 1st of August 2001).  
  7the objectives, control processes and operating modes of organizations in which it has 
been adopted. Following new-institutional arguments, the adopting modes of these 
systems should exhibit clear decoupling patterns between the formal structure which 
would evolve so as to conform the expectations of the organizations’ leading 
constituencies, and the technical core of these organizations i.e. how, in practice, they 
carry out their activities. 
 
3. NPM at Inf-Rail: a new performance measurement and management system 
 
In this Third Part we first present F-Rail and Inf-Rail, respectively the company 
and its Division where research was conducted. Then, drawing from archival 
documents, we describe the formal traits of the new performance system. This 
description is organised along the three main aspects of NPM as defined in Part Two, in 
order to evidence how the new system is intended to operationalize NPM at Inf-Rail. 
 
The case setting: an operating division in a public sector firm 
 
The case study is based on the implementation of a new performance system in 
Inf-Rail, a large division of F-Rail. F-Rail is a French railway company typical of the 
public sector firm: its majority shareholder is the French State and most F-Rail’s 
employees benefit from a special status guaranteeing them, among other advantages, 
life-long job security. This company has undergone major changes that can be related to 
public sector reform and the European Union policy of liberalization of utilities. 
Notably, the quasi monopolistic position that the company has held for decades is being 
questioned. In order to comply with the European Directive 91/440, two distinct legal 
entities were created in 1997 so as to separate activities that were formerly integrated in 
the same company. One entity, which we will call F-Net, was created for the purpose of 
owning, maintaining and developing the national railway infrastructure. However, F-
Net does not possess any own resource to realise network maintenance and 
development which are thus delegated to suppliers. F-Rail, the other and original entity, 
has been refocused on railway transportation operations (production and sales of 
transportation). However, contrasting with other rail arrangements in Europe (e.g. in the 
United Kingdom [Tyrrall, 2003; Casson, 2004]), it has been decided to maintain rail 
maintenance expertise within the transportation company (F-Rail), so that beside its 
main transportation activity, F-Rail is also active in railway maintenance and 
engineering. As a consequence, F-Rail is both a customer of F-Net for the use of the 
railway infrastructure and its supplier for the maintenance and engineering works.  
 
F-Rail’s organisation is both divisional and geographical. Divisions correspond 
to activities, namely railway equipment and traction; different segments of operations 
(freight, long distance lines, regional lines, Parisian lines); and infrastructure – the Inf-
Rail division. Divisional organisation is recent. It has been implemented after F-Net’s 
creation (1997) and aims at orienting the organisation towards customers and 
developing among its employees a greater sensitivity to economic issues. The objective 
assigned to each activity is profit making. The 23 regions run all the activities deployed 
locally in establishments. The existing regional organisation partly results from past 
(successive mergers of formerly independent local railway networks). 
 
  8As we have explained above, Inf-Rail’s geographical organisation has four 
levels:  
(1)  headquarters, which include various functional services (for instance 
Finance, Human Resource…) and Operations Direction in which sector directors 
supervise the regional delegations;  
(2)  the 23 regional delegations, that have functional but not hierarchical 
authority
3 on  
(3)  the establishments (around 120), themselves composed of several  
(4)  Operating Units (OU) – the field level for operations.  
 
While F-Rail has until now concentrated the expertise in terms of railway 
maintenance and engineering and has remained F-Net main supplier in this respect, F-
Net is however legally entitled to contract with any supplier regarding the development 
and maintenance of its network. The possibility of being exposed to competition and the 
new customer-supplier relationship has set the division of F-Rail dedicated to 
maintenance and engineering works (Inf-Rail) under heavy pressure for cost reduction 
and increased transparency and accountability. While Inf-Rail’s main client is the 
company F-Net, the Division also works for F-Rail’s other activities (real estate 
maintenance, for instance), but to a lesser extent. Such internal services are framed by 
internal contracts and in theory at least, internal customers can also call on any supplier 
and choose the most competitive for the services offered by Inf-Rail. 
 
The compensation system between Inf-Rail and F-Net is twofold. On the one 
hand, for the network current maintenance, a fixed annual budget is negotiated and it is 
understood between the two contracting entities that Inf-Rail has to undertake the 
contractual regular maintenance work irrespective of the real costs incurred during the 
year. The annual budget is under heavy pressure from the State to cut or stabilize 
spending. Indeed, following the separation between F-Net and F-Rail, the decision was 
made, presumably at the governmental level, that the budget devoted by F-Net to Inf-
Rail for railway maintenance was to remain approximately even in real currency terms. 
While, since then, the network has been extended and railway traffic has increased, the 
rationale was that extra maintenance production should be compensated by productivity 
gains on Inf-Rail part, thus putting this division under heavy pressure for cost 
reductions
4. On the other hand, for exceptional maintenance operations and network 
development, a price is negotiated between both entities on the basis of the work to 
realise.  
                                                           
3 Actually regional delegates and establishment managers behave as if their relations were hierarchical. 
Hierarchical supervision on establishments is formally granted to Region Directors (who have also 
functionally supervised Delegates for all activities since the creation of such positions in 1997). Since 
regional delegates’ responsibilities actually encroach on the Region Director’s scope of authority, 
authority questions in regions represent a very touchy topic. This explains why, although regional 
delegates behave as hierarchical supervisors of establishment managers, with these latter fully accepting 
this supervision, this is not officially recognised. 
4 The state of the railway network and the cost of maintaining the network have been debated and an 
independent audit committee has been commissioned at the end of 2004. The committee published its 
conclusions during summer 2005, underlining that, because of insufficient maintenance budget, the 
railway network could not be used at its full capacity. A Member of Parliament echoed this concern in a 
public statement inscribing the problem on the political agenda. In September 2005, when we were 
writing this article, the dismissal of F-Net CEO, who held this position since its creation, was announced.   
  9To sum up the reorganisation of French railway activities has inscribed 
competition within the sector and put heavy pressure on costs and efficiency. 
Competition and pressure are especially salient for sub-contractors - among them Inf-
Rail. 
  
Operationalizing NPM: the formal structure of the new performance system 
 
In this section we show how competition, and demand for cost reduction and 
efficiency are not only inscribed in legal and contractual arrangements, but also in the 
new performance measurement and management system. We also show how the system 
embodies the third aspect of NPM: transparency and accountability. Before entering 
such detailed considerations, we briefly explain how the system was developed.  
 
Development and general structure 
The implementation of the new performance measurement and management 
system is the second stage of a broader project of “renewal of production management”, 
which is itself the deployment in the Inf-Rail Division of more global projects launched 
at the corporate level (industrial project, renewal of accounting and management 
information systems…) when F-Rail and F-Net were established as separate legal 
entities (1997). In the Inf-Rail Division, the first step of this renewal was the 
reconstruction of cost and management accounting systems, which took place from 
1998 to 2001. The second step was initiated by the CEO of Inf-Rail Division during a 
Convention that gathered the managers of this division in October 2001. In his closing 
address to the management, the Division CEO announced that he made the decision to 
“renovate the production management”. Renovation was intended to be based on 
“contracts” and “accountability” through a “renewed management dialogue” at all four 
hierarchical levels (Closing address, 2001). The new performance measurement and 
management system that embodies “renovation” aims at: 
-  “optimizing contracting processes between the company’s different 
hierarchical levels”, 
-  “formalizing management dialogue in defining ways of implementation 




While the implementation was managed jointly by the Division’s Operations 
Direction and Finance Direction, this latter Direction, namely its Management 
Accounting and Control Department, was given the responsibility of designing the new 
system. The project was launched in January 2002 and the meetings using a renewed set 
of performance indicators started in April 2003. During the development time, several 
groups (referred to as “mirroring groups”) composed of all types of persons supposed to 
use the system (production managers, entity managers, management accountants) at 
different hierarchical levels, were permanently consulted on various characteristics of 
the system under implementation, so that to reach a reasonable level of agreement 
among future users.  
 
The project aimed at moving from a rather loose reporting system mainly based 
on justification of variances to a real management dialogue focused on action and 
improvement. Concretely the project has led to implementing:  
  10-  Regular performance meetings (locally called “management reviews”) at 
various hierarchical interfaces along the operational line (OU-establishment, 
establishment-region and region-sector). These meetings are organised on a monthly, 
bimonthly or once every four months basis depending on the hierarchical level. The 
participants are the entities’ managers (for instance OU manager and establishment 
manager) and their two assistants in charge of production and management control (if 
existing). The performance management meeting is structured along  
-  A performance scorecard (locally referred to as “reference document for 
management reviews”) that includes information about production progress, costs, 
punctuality, security, investment, and internal services. Actual figures for these 
indicators are compared to the budget. Punctuality and security are two traditional 
performance aspects in the company that refer to both service quality for customer and 
working conditions for employees. Production progress is not a new area of 
measurement, but the emphasis put on meeting the objectives of the budget is recent. As 
regards costs, investment and internal services, most indicators are new. 
 
This system substituted for infrequent and/or irregular performance meetings, 
depending on the hierarchical level. At the upper level, a unique member of the 
Operations Direction, at the Division headquarters, held two times a year the 23 
performance meetings with each regional delegate. At the lower level, meetings 
between regional and establishment levels used to be organized only once or twice a 
year and performance meetings at the field (OU) level were held infrequently and at the 
discretion of the head of the supervising establishment. According to our respondents, 
these meetings were ritualized events where justification for poor performance and 
expenses over budget were given without any consequence. Moreover, the reliability of 
reported figures was low. 
 
Before we had what we called “tournées de commandement” [literally, “rounds 
of command”]. It was highly recommended to come with an updated document 
(…) which was completed by the OU manager. Regarding reliability, the 
document was already fairly filtered since the OU manager could orient results. 
Although we still encounter few errors today, it was less neutral and less 
realistic (REGMAC). 
 
In many respects, the new management system can be regarded as 
operationalizing the three basic sets of principles of NPM as described in the literature 
review: (i) competition, (ii) transparency and accountability, (iii) cost reduction and 
efficiency. 
 
Specific features regarding the competition aspect of NPM 
Externally, Inf-Rail is due to be increasingly exposed to competition. As we 
have seen above, while Inf-Rail has until now concentrated the expertise in terms of 
railway maintenance and engineering and thus, remained F-Net main supplier, F-Net is 
however legally entitled to contract with any other supplier. Especially on the activity of 
railway development, Inf-Rail is regularly competing with other construction or 
engineering companies for F-Net markets. Exposure to competition and the new 
customer-supplier relationship between F-Net and Inf-Rail has set this division of F-
Rail under heavy pressure for cost reduction and increased transparency and 
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reference to markets or external competitors, external competition can be regarded as 
having infused its conception. Internally, the principle of comparing performances 
between units belonging to the same hierarchical level is, on the contrary, explicitly 
introduced in the new management system. Thus the Inf-Rail CEO called for a system 
in which “figures [could] be compared with performance standards or to references 
coming from other comparable entities” (Closing address, 2001). 
 
Specific traits addressing transparency and accountability concerns 
F-Net, acting as Inf-Rail customer for maintenance and development of the 
railway network, demands accounts regarding the production done in maintenance work 
and the progression of new construction work. Inf-Rail is accountable of production 
realised, not of costs. Since a fixed annual amount is negotiated for the current 
maintenance of the existing network regardless of realised costs (see above), the 
reporting is not focused on costs, yet on highly detailed information regarding the 
production actually completed. Costs exceeding the fixed budget are supported by Inf-
Rail, and F-Net control over Inf-Rail activity is focused on actual production outputs 
and quality measures regarding the operation of the railway system. Consistently the 
new system thus reports production through very detailed work units. Such a fine-
grained reporting system for maintenance production did not exist previously. 
 
Internally, transparency and accountability principles underlie key features of 
the new system. Notably, the new management system is presented as a “contractual 
process” between two contiguous hierarchical levels based on “figures that cannot be 
questioned” (Closing address, 2001). The contractual logic introduces a principal agent 
relationship, which implies clear objective setting coupled with measurable and 
observable results (Bourguignon et al., 2004). Transparency would also be achieved 
through increased frequency in management meetings, which should be held on a 
monthly, bimonthly or once every four months basis depending on the hierarchical 
level, in sharp contrast with what previously existed (see above). “Standardized 
performance scorecards”, detailed nomenclatures promoting homogeneous definitions, 
“efficient information systems” (Closing address, 2001) for data processing and 
reporting participate to achieving transparency and accountability. Transparency is also 
achieved through the performance scorecard itself, since its format was designed to be 
the same for everyone, irrespective of the hierarchical level or the geographical area and 
it should display the same set of performance metrics: “Management dialogue can only 
rely on homogeneous information, shared by everyone, and that can be traced. The 
metrics used must be the same at all hierarchical levels” (General outline, 2002). 
“Following realizations can only be achieved efficiently through a limited number of 
metrics, agreed by everyone and whose production mode is homogeneous (most of the 
time automatic) and unquestionable” (Reference manual, undated). 
 
Specific features regarding cost reduction and efficiency 
Cost reduction and efficiency are means to enhance the competitiveness of Inf-
Rail activities. Being competitive in terms of costs is important on the already disputed 
activity of railway network development.  
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negotiated with F-Net (see above). Accordingly, the Inf-Rail CEO referred to 
“enhancing performance” and “the result culture” (Closing address, 2001). It is further 
stated that “Inf-Rail has set for itself ambitious productivity objectives” (General 
outline, 2002). Following, the new management system was intended to be “not sheer 
reporting, but steps towards continuing progresses” (Closing address, 2001). In other 
words “(…) management reviews should enhance reactivity at the closer where 
production is done and the inscription [of the division] in steps towards continuing 
progresses” (General outline, 2002). The “management dialogue” that should take place 
thanks to the management review has then been defined more precisely as aiming at 
“defining objectives and action plans” and “analyzing actions made et results obtained; 
reacting; perfecting oneself”. “Management dialogue”, it is explained, “should not be 
mixed up with reporting” (Hands-out, 2003). “Management dialogue” is associated with 
“tomorrow, action, improving, correcting and learning, the team” and “a cooperative” 
attitude, whereas “sheer reporting” is deemed to be oriented towards “yesterday, 
recording, justifying, being sanctioned, the individual” and a “defensive” attitude 
(Hands-out, 2003). 
 
In terms of figures, the scorecard on which performance meetings should be 
based introduces at each hierarchical level and, most notably, at the level of operating 
units, the review of unit costs of many elementary maintenance operations. As we 
previously mentioned, reporting production work units responds to the concern of 
transparency and accountability towards F-Net. Budgeting and reporting unit costs 
stems directly from the willingness to compare production and economic performances 
of operating units and track variances from unit cost standards. The new system, 
providing operating unit managers and their hierarchy with detailed information on 
operating costs, should provide them with the means to make decisions on economic 
criteria, as opposed to decisions made on operating/production considerations alone. 
Information on costs and the consumption of resources, variance analysis, corrective 





In this Fourth part, we present our observations related to the implementation of 
each formal feature of the new performance system. We conclude whether it was 
actually implemented and used according to expectations, or whether decoupling was 
observed. The structure of the analysis is organized along the three main aspects of 




Though the formal structure of the new performance measurement and 
management system can not be directly related to external competition, increased 
competition as well as the fact that the division was henceforth working for an external 
customer have been mentioned by many interviewees as major changes justifying the 
adoption of the new system (n=13/29, twelve of them being line managers at various 
hierarchical levels): “We must prove that we are competent, otherwise we will be 
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concrete instances of external competition, our respondents’ discourses clearly indicated 
that they perceived their company and, most precisely, their division, as being 
embedded in a new competitive environment which called for changes in the 
performance management system. 
 
The new performance system also aimed at supporting increased internal 
competition by enabling internal benchmarking. This was an objective of the system 
and was seen as one of its advantages: “It is important to compare units with others” 
(REGDIR). Our observations of performance meetings demonstrate that this possibility 
was used in practice: both the local unit cost and production level were compared to the 
average figures for the whole division. Comparison was made during performance 
meetings to demonstrate that improvements were likely: “Your cost is below [your 
objective], but the objective is high compared to the national and the regional [cost]. 
You should have a look at it” (ESTDIR during a performance meeting with an OU). 
Though the relevance of these comparisons was sometimes contested, because of the 
idiosyncrasies of the local conditions of each unit, we observed that comparisons 
between national unit costs or production levels and local figures actually took place 
during 8 over 11 observed meetings at the three interfacing hierarchical levels. 
Altogether, these observations indicate that increased internal competition was both 
regarded as a goal of the new performance system and actually implemented in practice 
at all hierarchical levels. 
 
Transparency and accountability 
 
In terms of external transparency, the new system provides information for the 
control by F-Net over Inf-Rail activities. Our observations tend to confirm that control 
has been increased. As one sector’s director put it: “F-Net reporting forces us to enter 
deeply into details. It demands for instance details on crossbeam’s replacements. I know 
that if on one track I am at 17% and at the same time at 80% globally, I will be called 
into account” (SECDIR). This control is perceived as legitimate: “F-Net is our 
contracting authority [..] It is therefore logical that we owe it transparency” (ESTDIR). 
Given the contractual relationship between F-Net and Inf-Rail (see above), F-Net does 
not seem to look at costs into detail: “F-Net is more interested in quantities than unit 
costs” (SECDIR). However, having to calculate unit costs was considered as a being a 
direct consequence of F-Net’s creation. Moreover, at lower hierarchical levels, it was 
widely believed and considered as legitimate that F-Net would demand information on 
local unit costs: “We are F-Net’s provider. It is natural that F-Net wants to know the 
cost of a crossbeam’s replacement” (OUMAN).  
 
Internally, the new system aimed at increasing transparency and accountability 
by encouraging dialog on performance between different hierarchical levels. In sharp 
contrast with previous practice (see above), performance meetings are now held at all 
interfacing hierarchical levels, including OU, except in one establishment where 
establishment-OU meetings were only about to start at the time of our survey. 
Participants in these meetings are both staff (management accountants) and line 
managers (production and entity’s managers). We observed that some meetings were 
held on the phone because of the geographical distance between the reporting entity and 
  14its supervisor - a local arrangement that had not been anticipated and was disapproved 
by the Division Finance Department. These meetings on the phone included, 
performance meetings were held every two months between sectors and regions, every 
month between region and establishment and every two months or every month 
between establishments and operational units, depending on the establishments. Though 
the targeted objective of monthly meetings was not reached everywhere, the frequency 
in performance meetings did increase sharply. Moreover, the dialog on performance – 
including economic performance - between hierarchical levels has been developed and 
framed by the new system: “Performance meetings allow improving the [level of] 
information that people get since everyone talks about it from the establishment to the 
head of region. The whole hierarchical line is informed” (REGMAC). 
 
Displaying homogeneous and comparable indicators was one of the main goals 
of the new system. Our observations confirm that the same indicators, as being defined 
in the accounting nomenclature, are actually used at the various organisational levels. It 
is thus possible to compare the indicators of different entities or to aggregate them: “For 
each establishment, we have the same figures; it is the virtuous effect of competition” 
(REGMAC).  
 
However, in contradiction with the goal of the new system, we have observed 
the continuing use of previously existing, locally designed indicators. At the field level 
this can be explained by a lack of confidence in the way the nomenclature is applied: 
“What I am uncomfortable with is the fact of not knowing how [costs] are computed” 
(OUMAN). Such perceptions might be caused by the newness of the system coupled 
with its complexity, in particular in terms of number of analytical accounts and 
allocation bases. Despite indicators being homogeneous, their definition remains 
unclear or unknown: “[the allocation bases] are probably available but I don’t have 
them […]. I never asked them to the region” (ESTPROD). This leads to perceived 
inconsistencies between figures, casting doubt on the reliability of the centralized 
information system on which the new performance measures are based: “I sometimes 
have differences with other indicators I follow” (OUMAN). To sum up, indicators are 
homogeneous but their computation rules are not clearly understood at the field level. 
This can explain why actors still use locally designed indicators. 
 
Having an efficient system in terms of data processing was another objective of 
the system towards increased transparency. This feature of the system has actually been 
implemented: ‘Yes, yes, it is an industrialized document’ (REGMAC).  
 
Finally, basing all the performance meetings on a unique and standardized 
document is also a means of achieving transparency and accountability. On that point 
decoupling was clearly observed between the designed system and its use in practice. A 
unique and standardized scorecard was one of the main realizations that the new system 
intended to achieve. While it was unanimously perceived as an important and positive 
objective, various interviewees told us that “the document serving as guide for 
performance meetings [included] the new tableau de bord as well as other documents 
coming from elsewhere” (REGDIR) or that “now we receive the new tableau de bord, 
but we don’t really work on it” (OUMAN). Consistently we observed that all 
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scorecard being at best one of these documents only. 
[In terms of documents] in addition to the ‘Establishment Project’, we have a 
few elements on the unit cost variances, […] we also have the [new] tableau de 
bord that we have adapted, completed with some regional ingredients and the 
‘2004 Objective Contract Sheet’. Plus the synthesis of the main points of the 
establishment director’s ‘EIA’ [Annual Individual Appraisal] (REGDIR 
describing the documents used at the start of a performance meeting with an 
establishment). 
 
Though implemented in the whole organization, consistently with what had been 
designed by its promoters, the new scorecard thus has failed to be used accordingly. On 
this point, a clear decoupling appears between the formal system and its practical use. 
 
Efficiency and cost reduction 
 
The new system aimed at including unit costs in performance evaluation. Indeed, 
before the implementation of the new system, unit costs were not calculated or 
controlled at lower levels: “Beforehand, we were informed of the national unit cost. But 
we were not able to provide the cost per production unit and the number of units 
produced” (ESTMAC). Now, unit costs are available and discussed at all hierarchical 
levels. In all observed meetings, unit costs of many production units have been analysed 
and discussed.  
 
Moving toward decision making, beyond analysis, was one of the main 
objectives of the new system. To that end, the new scorecard included a specific (final) 
sheet called “decision report”. However, our observations suggest that a clear 
decoupling exists on this point. Indeed, in all the meetings attended, we never observed 
any real discussion of an action plan following notice of an unfavourable variance. We 
even did not observe the decision to organize a specific meeting to try and find solutions 
to a problem encountered. On the contrary, meetings were mainly devoted to justifying 
variances to the upper hierarchical level, and observation suggests that the latter was 
actually happy to collect information for, in turn, being able to justify variances during 
its own next performance meeting with its upper hierarchical level. Simultaneously, 
interviewees were all convinced of the importance of moving from sheer analysis (“a 
culture of justification”) to decision making: “Management reviews shall not be devoted 
anymore to analysis in order to provide a justification, but [shall be devoted] to find 
action plans” (SECDIR). All respondents seemed also convinced that this was what they 
actually did in performance meetings: “At the end of the meeting, we make a report 
including the decision made (pieces of decision, person in charge, timing)” (OUMAN). 
In fact, they apparently considered that putting an indicator under control was an action 
plan. As heard during performance meetings: 
I do take note ‘action proposal: following up of the indicator ‘advancement [of 
production]’. Objective 100% (SECDIR). 
Action proposal: global control of purchased materials and services (SECDIR). 
On this point I make a concrete action proposal: for next operations, can we 
check that we are going to perform at the budget level (SECDIR). 
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sought in external events and causes such as bad weather conditions, improper (or late) 
delivery of material or equipment or difficulties in obtaining long enough periods of 
time between two trains to realize maintenance work. Operating responsibilities of 
neither the reporting entity, nor its immediate upper hierarchical level, were really 
questioned. In fact, all participants in performance meetings behaved as if they were all 
good professional that is, knowing how to do their jobs and actually striving to perform 
highly, and simultaneously recognizing these qualities to their fellow participants. 
Accordingly, variances were accounted for operating conditions that were not under the 
control of either the reporting entity or the upper hierarchical level. Investigating 
variances so as to identify possible corrective action plans might have demanded 
shedding light on technically or operationally improper decisions and behaviours, thus 
violating the social belief that all organization’s members were good professionals. 
Performance meetings were therefore turned into mere institutionalized rituals. 
 
Finally, beyond deciding action plans, the new system aimed at encouraging the 
use of economic criteria to make decision in an environment where security and 
punctuality are the main goals. On this point our observations really differ according to 
people met. Some of them clearly deny that there could be a link between the new 
system and any change in the decision making process: “I hardly use it [the new tableau 
de bord]” (REGDIR). Such assertion was encountered at various hierarchical levels: “I 
personally don’t use it” (SECDIR). Moreover, a few interviewees obviously discovered 
the content of the tableau de bord during our interview (!) clearly indicating that they 
didn’t use it: “[looking at the performance scorecard] Hey, I never noticed that there 
was something about punctuality in [the tableau de bord]. Yes, yes, it corresponds to 
the indicators we follow elsewhere” (REGDIR). Finally, some respondents clearly 
asserted that economic considerations were still not a priority: “in terms of importance, 
the objectives are 1. security, 2. punctuality and 3. costs” (REGDIR). But on another 
hand, though we did not observe instances of decision made on economic 
considerations, several observations indicate that this economic dimension was 
permeating into the organization. Discourses held by some of our respondents tend to 
attest that real changes in the way of making decision were taking place: “If, [for a 
project] technicians say what the unit cost [stemming from technical considerations] 
will be, it may happen that it’s refused at the national level because it’s too far from the 
national cost” (ESTPROD). “We know that we will be looked at on our costs, so we 
question ourselves beforehand […]. I will stop replacing [rails] by 4 meters
5. We should 
try and work at night with longer working intervals” (ESTDIR). Respondents or 
participants in performance meetings also mentioned examples of decision made 
outside the meetings or independently from variance analyses, indicating that economic 
considerations had actually been included in decision processes. For instance, in a 
performance meeting, a participant explained that he will not keep on employing 
personnel belonging to another entity
6: “Wait, I don’t have the money to pay them […] 
We keep four of them, the others, they go away […] It is not reasonable (…) to take 
people who cost us 2000 euros a month” (ESTDIR during a performance meeting with 
                                                           
5 This refers to the minimum length of rail replaced. Rails can also be replaced by 8 meter-length which 
reduces unit cost but can lead to replace more rails than actually needed. 
6 In order to fit local workloads, it is usual to move employees temporarily from one establishment to 
another. 
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increase in price had been submitted to a customer, on the basis of the expense incurred 
for the maintenance of its dedicated track. We also observed several discussions about 
how to decrease unit costs, for instance negotiating longer intervals between trains for 
maintenance or grouping operations in order to share security costs associated with 
maintenance. The following sentence (also heard during a performance meeting) 
witnesses for the perceived relationship between cost and action: “Work that cannot be 
done within the cost envelop, it is better not to do it” (ESTPROD). These observations 
indicate that economic considerations, in several instances at least, did change the way 
of perceiving action, and sometimes, doing things. 
 
Altogether, our analysis shows that though many features of the new 
performance management system relating to or operationalizing NPM principles had 
actually been implemented, other key traits exhibited clear decoupling patterns or mixed 
evidence. Table 1 summarizes these observations. 
 
(Please insert table 1 about here) 
 





Decoupling and new institutionalist theory 
 
Our case study has evidenced the existence of decoupling instances in the 
adoption of the management performance system in the public firm under study. 
Decoupling has three aspects. First, it lies in the difference observed between discourse 
in terms of “performance meetings generating action plans” and the lack of related 
observation - thereafter “action plan decoupling”. Second, it is related to the document 
serving as the basis of exchange and discussion during performance meetings which is 
never as such the centrally designed scorecard but locally tailored documents that 
substitute to or supplement the scorecard assumed to play solely this role - thereafter 
“scorecard decoupling”. Third, it stems from (less clear-cut however dominant) 
observations that actors do not use the new performance scorecard for decision and 
management - thereafter “decision decoupling”. 
 
Though the system had been deployed in the whole organization, decoupling 
was observed in the way the system was actually used by participants in this 
organization. This result suggests that analyses on organizational decoupling in new 
institutional accounts of the diffusion and adoption of management innovations could be 
enriched if three levels were identified in the adoption pattern of an innovation by an 
organization. In empirical studies, adopting an innovation is often analysed as or 
operationalized by a binary variable that allows splitting a population of organizations 
between adopters and non-adopters (e.g. Staw and Epstein, 2000). As our case study 
illustrates, adopting an innovation encompassing the whole organizational structure 
such as a new performance management system is likely to overlap a large variety of 
situations in terms of deployment and practical uses of this innovation. Following, 
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adoption by an organization of any new management system, once the organization has 
been confronted with this innovation and the decision has been announced towards its 
introduction in the formal structure of the organization. 
1.  The first step would refer to the “design” of the management 
system intended to introduce the innovation in the formal structure of the 
organization. In our study, Inf-Rail had been confronted with the principles of 
NPM that had been diffusing in the French public sector, as well as within the 
company. The decision had been made to adopt these principles and this move 
had been announced by the division head during an internal convention. 
Following, a project team had been formed, an external consultant hired and the 
new system, operationalizing NPM principles, had been designed. The system 
accommodated NPM principles to the perceived needs and constraints of the 
organization. Public statements, reports, booklets of rules and procedures and 
the new scorecard constitute the output of this first step. 
2.  The second step would correspond to the “implementation” of the 
new system. Once the system has been designed, it could be implemented in the 
organization. In our case study, implementation would refer to the full 
deployment of the system in the organization, which includes the operation of 
new information systems, procedures and processes regarding performance 
scorecard and performance meetings.  
3.  The third step would refer to the “utilisation” of the new system, 
i.e. how it is appropriated (or not) by its users, how the practical use of the 
system conforms to or deviates from what had been designed, how and in which 
respect the system impacts the actual work practices in the adopting 
organization. 
 
Most studies have analyzed the existence of decoupling in what would be the 
first two levels in our proposed grid of analysis of the adoption stages. Studies analyse 
decoupling in terms of discrepancy between what has been made public (the formal 
system as it as been referred to) and what has actually been implemented. Companies 
would, for instance, publicly talk about adopting TQM without implementing it (Staw 
and Epstein, 2000). Regarding NPM adoption, for instance, Pettersen (1995) 
documented a decoupling between budgets and actuals in Norwegian hospitals, where 
the formal budgetary decision process did not include ex-post accounting information 
from the previous year. Such a decoupling lies between two elements of the system 
(budget decision and prior year accounting figures) which are not formally related: 
indeed the budgetary process does not include any reference to prior year realisation. In 
contrast to such findings, which have evidenced decoupling at the design or 
implementation step, decoupling in our case study has only been observed at the third, 
utilisation level. As we have seen before, there is no apparent decoupling at the design 
level: the various elements of new management system can be deemed to faithfully 
operationalize NPM principles and supposedly enhance transparency and 
accountability, competition and cost-consciousness in this organization. Regarding the 
second level, the implemented system corresponds to the announced one with financial 
and non-financial performance measures deployed at all hierarchical levels of the 
division. Implementation had been undertaken centrally and, with a few exceptions of 
some indicators undocumented in the scorecard, what had been designed had been 
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decision decoupling all lie at the third, utilisation level of the new system. 
 
Collective decoupling and individual action 
 
Our findings regarding decision decoupling are not clear-cut. Indeed on the one 
hand, we observed many cases of actors declaring that they did not use the new 
performance scorecard for decision and management - with some extreme cases of 
managers even not knowing the existence of some indicators therein! On the other hand, 
fewer observations revealed that the economic criterion was fully integrated into 
decision (i.e. personnel management or price decision). Such examples suggest that the 
new performance measurement system, with its strong emphasis on meeting budget 
targets especially cost ones, does occasionally influence decision. Since we mainly 
observed disregard of the new performance scorecard, we made a conclusion in terms of 
decoupling at the institutional level.  
 
However this lack of convergence of individual attitudes and behaviours raises 
the question of the relationship between the collective and the individual levels of 
analysis. The new institutionalist theory is interested in institutions, and consistently 
decoupling is defined at the level of structure and organisation - i.e. the collective level. 
As long as we study steps in the diffusion and adoption of management methods which 
are centralised (e.g. in our research, design and implementation), we observe processes 
and possibly decoupling at the organisational (collective) level. But when we come to 
the utilisation step, we cannot leave individuals aside. Let us take the example of 
decision. Utilisation may be collective (e.g. what is decided in performance meetings), 
but it is also individual: some pieces of decision are indeed made at the individual level 
without any reference to or permission from another person. Although it is generally 
admitted that individuals in organisations share norms, values, etc. to a certain extent, 
they still remain individuals with their unique way of perceiving and reacting to their 
environment. Hence it is not surprising to find individual differences in how participants 
use management systems. 
 
Moreover collective decision is the outcome of a compromise (more rarely a 
consensus) among group participants who have made individual proposals for the 
decision to make. Collective decision includes human processes (perception, 
information collection, evaluation, etc.) leading to individuals proposals and social 
processes (influence, power, negotiation, etc.) framing the final compromise decision. 
This means that in an organisation, whatever the level of agreement on norms and 
values, patterns of collective decision can vary depending on both the individuals 
involved and the balance of power within the group. This is a further possible 
explanation of divergent observations regarding the use of management systems in 
organisations. 
 
To draw a conclusion at the institutional level from observations realised at 
individual and sub-group levels (as in present research), the researcher has to delineate 
an average pattern (here, our conclusion in terms of decision decoupling). Clearly such 
construction is not free from his/her subjectivity. But there is no other way since 
divergent observations in social life are irreducible (otherwise it would not be social 
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and lower levels (sub-groups and individuals). In the firm studied here, design and 
implementation of the new management system were centralised, hence the problem of 
reconciling different levels of analysis only emerged when we came to study the last 
step (utilisation) of adoption of the new management system. But reconciliation may 
also be a concern at prior steps (implementation, design) if they are decentralised. In 
such cases, various patterns of implementation (or design) are likely to occur, creating 
then a need to construct an “institutional” pattern for the purpose of the analysis.  
 
Decoupling, resistance and power 
 
Decoupling at the utilisation level (that is, difference between expectations as 
represented by discourse and observed practice) may be reinterpreted in terms of 
resistance from actors towards the ongoing change. Our findings are consistent with 
prior research regarding the consideration of actors’ interests and power relationships in 
explaining resistance to change (Covalevski et al., 1993; Oliver, 1991; Modell, 2001). 
Unlike in Collier’s case study (2001), the legitimating processes associated with NPM 
failed to produce a shift in existing power relationships within the organisation and no 
reconciliation of conflicting interested emerged.  In our case setting, professionals have 
run the company since decades. Indeed rail technicians can be considered as 
professionals, although unlike chartered accountants or physicians, all rail professionals 
are employed within this unique rail company
7. The company organises the profession 
along with detailed qualifications, associated internal degrees, and strict employment 
norms. The main rail professional norms are technical excellence and obsession for 
security. Comparatively economic management concerns have been introduced only 
very recently. At the company (F-Rail) level, the management control function has been 
established in 1991. In the Division studied, legitimacy is still largely a matter of 
technical expertise, even at upper management levels. At the time of the survey, the Inf-
Rail CEO, who had a very long field (rail) experience in the company, was primarily 
perceived as a professional whatever his present management role and position.  
 
The new performance management system has been designed and implemented 
by the Finance Department of the Division. This is sometimes explicitly considered as 
encroaching on professionals’ responsibility and territory. As a Regional Management 
Accountant explained: 
It is not that people from the Production Department are not interested by 
management [i.e. economic management] but they would like [economic] 
management to be under their control. What we want, us [i.e. management 
accountants], is that actors are accountable to the Regional Executive Manager, 
not the Production Manager. In some regions management accounting is 
supervised by the Production Department. (…). Production would like to get 
control back. For instance in our region, the Production Department has a 
                                                           
7 At first sight the Parisian Underground company could be considered also as a rail company. However 
from a technical and maintenance viewpoint there are lot of differences (e.g. the way crossbeams support 
the track and related maintenance consequences). The fact that these two companies have their own 
internal qualification norms and training programs witnesses for the uniqueness of each company 
regarding technical occupations. 
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Accounting Departments were under control of the Production Department, 
and they [the Production Department] would like to get back to this situation.  
Interviewer: Why do they want to gain control over management back? 
Because money is power and production is such a serious business that they do 
not want management accountants to get involved in it! 
 
The various types of utilisation decoupling observed can be analysed as 
expressing the resistance from rail professionals towards the new management system. 
This resistance is consistent with their long established power positions. With regard to 
power, it is worth noting that at the end of our survey, we were told that the scorecard 
was under revision, with the Production Department, not the Finance Department, 
being in charge of re-design. The following quote, from a Sector Director interview, 
shows how the power conflict between accountants and rail professionals, which 
ultimately ended up in favour of professionals, is masked under a façade of irrelevance 
regarding users’ needs: 
The central [i.e. Divisional] Finance Department [which developed the first 
scorecard] is not very happy that its scorecard, the one they have designed, is 
being given up. (…) It is true that experience…  I do not know if a scorecard 
with a Management Control flavour, designed by management accountants, 
can be appropriated by those who use it, those from Production. (SECDIR) 
 
At the beginning of this article, drawing on general observations of the French 
public sector, we hypothesised that we should observe a certain level of decoupling 
since there were social forces resisting the adoption of NPM in France. Our analysis 
validates this hypothesis. The paragraphs above provide insight into how, in a particular 
context, resistance and power generate decoupling. 
 
Decoupling, resistance and the balance of external and internal legitimacies 
 
Pettersen (1995) has observed a decoupling between beliefs about how the 
system would operate (beliefs from “politicians and bureaucrats”) and the way 
professional actors really used the system. Drawing on March and Olsen (1989), she 
analyses decoupling as resulting from differences in how action is represented by 
respectively the former and the latter. She argues that, while persons involved in 
political and administrative processes represent action in terms of “preferences and 
expected consequences” (logic of consequentiality), professionals define primarily 
action in terms of “obligation” towards the public (logic of appropriateness) (Pettersen, 
1995: 217).  
 
Such discrepancy between belief and realisation is also documented in present 
research and the explanation in terms of both types of logic appears very relevant. The 
notion of obligation towards the public is central in our case study, as illustrated by the 
following excerpt which contrasts professional obligations with administrative tasks 
having vital consequences for performance measurement and management:  
[On time and reliable data entry] is not, and cannot be, the priority of the 
establishment. The priority is reaching an adequate level of security. (…) Plus 
the regularity of train circulations. We are not at the top either. You cannot 
  22have 36 priorities. When a superior tells me “this is your priority”, I answer 
“no, I care about it but it is not my priority”. It is an important element, we are 
making efforts. When all other points are at the top, it can be my priority. 
(ESTDIR) 
 
Pettersen’s interpretation illuminates the action plan decoupling we observed. 
Indeed defining action plans implicitly assumes the very idea of consequence or cause-
effect relationship: action plans are defined because action is supposed to improve 
performance (consequence). When action is not conceived in terms of consequences, as 
observed at Inf-Rail, action plans are not the natural way of engaging into action.   
 
Resistance is consistent with the bases of legitimacy within the Division, i.e. 
shared values and representations about “good work”. Technical excellence, not 
economic performance, is a value to professionals. With very few exceptions, all 
persons interviewed have been trained as professionals and those occupying a 
management or administrative position today had often before a significant career as 
professionals. In terms of representations and logic, we cannot delineate two 
populations as Pettersen (1995) did (professionals versus non-professionals).  Surveyed 
managers and management accountants are not occupying professional positions 
anymore but since they have been long socialised as professionals, they are likely to 
develop spontaneously professionals’ representation about action (obligation) possibly 
competing with other representation (expected consequences) attached to their present 
management or administrative position. This can explain the striking decoupling of 
upper management level’s discourse and practice. On the one hand, Sector Directors 
(headquarters level) develop an explicit discourse regarding what we must do now with 
the new management system (action plans) and what we did in the past and should not 
do anymore (justification and lack of reaction). On the other hand, during performance 
meetings they do not put any pressure on the adoption (or even discussion) of action 
plans, and seem to be satisfied with various types of justification for poor performance. 
Decoupling here does not result from the gap between non-professionals’ discourse and 
professionals’ practice, as in Pettersen’s (1995) study; it emerges from the gap between 
professionals’ discourse and practice, which might be more surprising. We believe that 
to a certain extent, these managers are not conscious of the gap between their discourse 
and practice
8. As managers they “rationally” construct action in terms of consequences 
(and claim for a proactive use of performance measures). However discourse poorly 
describes their spontaneous perception of action - that of professionals, consistent with 
both their own career experience and the shared bases of legitimacy in the organisation. 
Eventually in performance meetings where their legitimacy towards participants (i.e. 
professionals) is at stake, they behave according to shared professional norms (and fully 
accept justification relying on professional obligations and constraints).  
 
This discussion suggests that decoupling can be understood as a way of 
balancing both external and internal legitimacy demands. Discourse enables to maintain 
a certain level of legitimacy towards external stakeholders (here, F-Net). Practice needs 
to be aligned with internal legitimacy bases if management wants to maintain the 
                                                           
8 Insincerity and conscious hypocrisy could be an alternative explanation. However we think that such an 
attitude would not be acceptable from an “honour” viewpoint - an important criterion in social 
relationships in France (d’Iribarne, 1989). 
  23legitimacy granted by internal stakeholders (here, rail professionals). Hence, when 
external and internal legitimacy bases are discrepant, decoupling is a means of obtaining 
external legitimacy without impinging internal legitimacy. Such an idea has already 
been expressed. Thus, in slightly different terms, Ansari and Euske (1987: 563) stated 
that “the divergence between stated objectives and their implementation is a reasonable 
means for gaining control internally and legitimacy externally”. Since decoupling can 
occur at different steps of the adoption process (see above), we propose to extend 
Ansari and Euske’s proposal to all these steps (design/implementation/utilisation). 
 
Present research suggests also discussing the point that decoupling would be a 
pro-active tactic. While this has been explicitly claimed by Oliver (1991) and Brignall 
and Modell (2000), Modell (2001) more recently suggested that decoupling could not 
always be a pro-active strategy and proposed to examine carefully the specific context 
in which decoupling occurs to determine its exact nature. The above example of the 
discrepancy of attitudes and behaviours of Sector Directors regarding action plans 
evidences that decoupling can largely be a matter of non-conscious processes. In the 
occurrence of decoupling, context (here, meetings gathering professionals, whatever 
their present position) appears an important element. In such meetings, the salience of 
professional norms probably explains the decoupled behaviour. Other circumstances 
(for instance, meetings with funding bodies’ participants) would maybe not make 
professional norms so salient, and thus would not generate decoupling. 
 
Finally our observations rejoin Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) proposition that 
decoupling is not sustainable if it is not coupled with the “the logic of confidence and 
good faith” and “ceremonial inspection and evaluation”: “The assumption that things 
are as they seem, that employees and managers are performing their roles properly, 
allows an organization to perform its daily routines in a decoupled structure” (1977: 
358). Such an assumption was implicitly made during performance meetings when all 
participants agreed on external explanations (bad weather, short working intervals, late 
deliveries, etc) of poor performance – assuming that everybody performed his role 
properly. Meyer and Rowan explain that “rationalized rituals of inspection and 
evaluation” are being institutionalized since “evaluation and inspection are public 
assertion of societal control that violates the assumptions that everyone is acting with 
competence and in good faith” (1977: 359). If Inf-Rail performance meetings were not 
ritualized, i.e. if there was no action plan decoupling, this would break the assumption 
that everybody behaves as a competent and responsible professional and therefore, 
would probably be interpreted as a public offence.  
 
Decoupling, coercive change and national context 
 
It has been hypothesised that decoupling was more likely to arise in countries of 
coercive change. Thus Brignall and Modell (2000) contrasted cases of implementation 
of multidimensional (i.e. financial and non-financial) performance measurement 
systems in the UK and in Sweden. They suggested that since implementation had been 
imposed more coercively in the UK, decoupling between financial and non-financial 
performance measures had been greater than in Sweden.  
 
  24Coming back to our case study, there is no doubt that the Finance Department 
has imposed the new performance management system rather coercively on 
professionals (see the excerpts above on power conflict). This is aligned with French 
traditions. Indeed France has a long history of absolute monarchy and coercive change. 
The French Revolution does not escape the rule. Admittedly unions at F-Rail are very 
powerful but as far as we know, the new performance management system has not been 
discussed with unions, which are keener to scrutinise HR policies and other elements 
likely to impinge workers’ interests. The coercive imposition of the new performance 
management system led to decoupling and eventually to re-designing of the scorecard, 
with the responsibility thereof given to rail professionals, not finance experts anymore. 
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) have proposed to distinguish two groups of 
countries with respect to adoption of NPM. On the one hand, “the core NPM group” 
(Australia, New Zealand, the UK) see “a large role for private sector forms and 
techniques in the process of restructuring the public sector”. On the other hand, 
“Continental European modernizers” (Belgium, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Italy, 
Sweden) continue to place “greater emphasis on the state as the irreplaceable integrative 
force in society, with a legal personality and operative value system that cannot be 
reduced to the private sector discourse of efficiency, competitiveness, and consumer 
satisfaction” – referred to as “NWS” (Neo-Weberian State) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004: 98). Regarding rail companies, there is indeed a difference between the French 
modernisation and the British privatisation. However our case study suggests that 
orientations towards market, consumer satisfaction, competitiveness and efficiency can 
fully cohabit within the NWS model.  
 
The implementation of this new performance management system at Inf-Rail 
appears as a rather late event in the diffusion/adoption of NPM in France. Some public 
companies, for instance France Telecom, the telecommunication company, have been 
engaged in NPM, especially in the implementation of new performance measurement 
and management systems, since the eighties (see Amintas and de Swarte, 1997). Non-
academic observation
9 also evidences that management control systems have strongly 
developed in public defence activities since about the same time. While the 
management control function has been fully recognised as autonomous in 1991 at the 
company level, the implementation of a new performance management system in one of 
its Divisions (Inf-Rail) more than ten years later may be surprising. This delay can be 
explained by the large autonomy of the Divisions regarding their specific information 
and management systems (which makes sense since their activities are very different) 
and the necessity to entirely re-build the Division’s cost accounting system before 
developing performance management systems. The fact that the company’s (central) 
financial accounting system has been also totally renovated in 1997 suggests that 
modernisation has not followed a linear pace. One can wonder what the real scope of 
management control was in the early nineties if it relied on obsolete accounting 
systems... This could probably have been analysed in terms of decoupling – at the 
design and/or implementation step. 
 
                                                           
9 Mainly students’s reports/works and communications at specialised practitioners’ conferences on NPM 
in France. 
  25Finally, as far as we know, research on NPM in France has not used hitherto a 
new institutionalist perspective but has rather focused on resistance and/or difficulty to 
change, role conflicts or contradictions (see for instance, recent research by, 
respectively, Glee, 2005; Guéry, 2005; and Crozet and Desmarais, 2005). While it is 
thus difficult to compare and contrast our findings regarding decoupling, there are 
commonalities between our analysis of decoupling and for instance Glee’s (2005: 1) 
analysis of why a new system did “not produce the expected outcome”. In both cases 
professionals’ logic appears to conflict with NPM principles embedded in the new 




In this paper, we analyzed the diffusion in France of NPM principles with a case 
study of the adoption a new performance measurement and management system in a 
large public railway company. We focused our analysis on the adoption mode of the 
new system by confronting the formal system as it had been designed and deployed in 
the organization, the discourses of its promoters and users, and their practices through 
the direct observation of performance management meetings. Coherent with new 
institutionalist accounts of the diffusion and adoption of management innovations, we 
observed clear decoupling patterns between some aspects of the formal system and how 
it had been appropriated by its users. Elaborating on the notion of decoupling, we 
propose that three levels shall be identified in the adoption stage of a new management 
system: design, implementation, and utilization. We observed that, contrary to adoption 
patterns observed in previous studies, decoupling between formal structure and work 
practices occurred at the utilization level of the new system. Focusing the analysis of 
decoupling on the utilization level, though, raises questions regarding the interpretation 
of individual actions: while we interpreted our observations in terms of decoupling, we 
did find individual differences in how participants used the new management system. At 
the utilization level, decoupling can indeed be interpreted in terms of actors’ resistance 
to change, power games and the willingness to appear legitimate in the eyes of both 
external and internal constituencies. In our case study, the bases for external and 
internal legitimacy being clearly discrepant, formally adopting the new system infused 
with NPM principles preserved the external legitimacy of the management while 
practices were being kept aligned with working rules and routines of rail professionals. 
 
In this case study, new institutionalism appeared a fruitful perspective to 
understand the processes associated with the adoption of the new management system, 
thus illustrating the diffusion of NPM in a French public firm. As we mentioned, 
though, introducing the utilization level in the analysis of how the organization adopted 
the new system raises a methodological question. While the theoretical level of analysis 
in a new institutionalist perspective is that of organizations embedded in a socio-
economic context, conclusions in terms of decoupling should necessarily rely on the 
close observation of organizational, group and individual uses of the new system in any 
adopting organization. Following, data collection and analysis should combine both 
collective and individual levels. Our study is not devoid of this limitation affecting 
many new institutionalist accounts of the diffusion and adoption of management 
innovations. Though we analyzed the adoption of the new system up to the utilization 
level, our analyses still focused on the collective utilization of the system on the 
  26occasion of performance management meetings which might not allow to faithfully 
accounting for the variety in individual decisions and practical uses of the system. This 
militates for the thorough integration of individual work practices and the meanings that 
users of new systems attach to what they actually do in the framework of analysis for 
studies of changes associated with the introduction of management innovations. Further 
longitudinal observation would also be useful for fully appreciating the impact of 
innovative systems following their adoption by organizations.   
 
Our analysis has shown the importance of actors’ behaviours regarding the 
adoption of innovations. Thus what is important is not whether a new management 
device is an innovation but whether it is perceived by actors as an innovation. Since any 
change encompasses a certain level of newness, any change is likely to be perceived by 
actors as an innovation, to a certain extent. Hence the analyses conducted in this article 
should not only contribute to our understanding of managerial innovations, but more 
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  29Table 1: New performance measurement and management system and NPM: a synthesis 
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NPM Principle  System features  Observations 
Competition  Possibility to internally benchmark 
performance  
Implemented 
Increased transparency and 
accountability towards F-Net 
Implemented 
Improved hierarchical dialog on 
economic performance 
Implemented 
Existence of standardized 
indicators 
Implemented 





Use of the standard performance 
scorecard as the reference for 
performance meetings 
Clear decoupling patterns 
Introduction of unit costs as 
important performance measures 
Implemented 
Moving from justification to 
decision making 
Clear decoupling patterns 
Efficiency and cost 
reduction 
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